H
aving recently retired after 40 years as a designer of vehicle control systems, I have had time to reflect on the design process I was involved with throughout my career. Most of us under the day-to-day pressures of technical programs that are usually on the edge of a schedule slip or cost overrun, or both, have little time to consider any far-reaching cultural implications of our products. To be sure, the marketing pitch promotes the positive results when new technology is developed and in the hands of the user. Rarely does it discuss potential human interaction problems that might result from its application-matters that are outside the scope of the technical design specification. Because new technology typically evolves due to entrepreneurial efforts or reaction to customer demand, we seldom look beyond specification boundaries to carefully evaluate subtle product use consequences.
Indeed, many believe that market evaluation, with its cost-benefit analysis, is all that is necessary, but the effects of new technology on culture and the individual are almost never part of these analyses because they are difficult to define in dollar values. Certainly, environmental impact and safety are high on the list of public concerns, particularly in light of the recent nuclear leak in Tokyo and lingering memories of Chernobyl and Three Mile Island. Further down the list are the effects of product characteristics on human response and behavior. For example, more automation in our automobiles, such as automatic cruise control or collision avoidance systems, could reduce the capability of drivers to react quickly in nonautomated cars or in situations where the performance of the automated system has been compromised.
Markets and Design Boundaries
In designing control systems for plant processes, building environmental management, aircraft control, or transportation management, to name a few applications of our technology, we tend to focus on the performance of a device or system within defined boundaries. Generally, the more functions we can control within those boundaries, and the more complexity we can manage and bring within the controlling authority's sphere of influence, the better our system concept is perceived to be. Under these conditions, overall system performance is improved, the possibility of human error is generally reduced, and the product is more desirable in the marketplace. The downside is characterized by Tenner, who recognized that the complexity of mechanical systems makes it impossible to test for all possible malfunctions and makes it inevitable that in actual use, some great flaws will appear that were hidden from the designers. [1, p. 13] Such flaws need not be actual mechanism failures, but could, through normal operation, produce an undesired effect on the human user or the environment. For example, it is becoming evident that television and video games have social impact, the automobile and its freeway system affect urban development and reclamation, and portable entertainment devices and e-mail are taking their toll on interpersonal communication skills. Each of these could be considered a generalization of Tenner's "failures" that we should add to a design database for the next product improvement.
The better we become at diminishing the requirement for human judgment, the more evident it is that there is a price to be paid in terms of the effectiveness of human response-in effect, a "deskilling." We design products in an iterative manner, learning from past experience and from observing our designs in use. When physical failures or software errors surface, they are simply corrected in an ensuing product revision. It would seem then that the design engineer, or the engineering team, has a responsibility to somehow consider the emerging cultural "costs" as well, bringing these considerations within design boundaries.
As some members of the technical community become concerned about these cultural trends, they seek to redefine engineering roles to include these sociological or human-centered processes in basic designs. On the other hand, equally serious and knowledgeable people dispute the crisis mentality of the critics of technology and the reactions of the media, pointing to the incredible technological advances and the benefits they have made possible. In considering the questions of responsibility and deskilling, I will first examine a useful definition of technology, then look specifically at an application of automation gone awry.
A Definition of Technology
The Random House Dictionary defines technology as "the application of knowledge for practical ends, as in a particular field: educational technology." Or possibly more to the point, "the sum of the ways in which a social group provides itself with the material objects of its civilization." Although incomplete, the latter definition correctly implies that technology is not free of its cultural surroundings.
If we take the bicycle as an example, the 1870 velocipede, "with its huge, pedal driven front wheel and small trailing wheel [was] popular with athletic and daring gentlemen, although of less appeal to others." [2, p. 367] As interest in this mode of transportation increased, the "safety bicycle" appeared in 1885 and had most of the features of today's modern bicycle. It could be ridden comfortably, and as Cardwell further notes, "encouraged women as well as men to take to the road." Obviously, the culture of society had an impact on the evolution of the bicycle. Hiram Maxim speculated that this technology, with the evolving rubber tires, influenced the growth of transportation through a realization of the possibilities of longer distance travel over ordinary highways as an adjunct to the railroad [2, p. 367]. In addition, its production methodology became a basis for other machines through the development of metal stamping [3, p. 190] . We can argue then that any concept of technology must have strong links to cultural and economic forces.
Arnold Pacey, a U.K.-based physicist and lecturer on technology policy, arrives at a definition of technology that is far more inclusive of these cultural aspects than our original Random House version. He has coined the term "technology practice," and its definition is summarized in Fig. 1 [4, p. 3] . With cultural, organizational, and technical aspects as a three-point foundation, this definition moves from a restricted view of technology as a collection of devices and resources to one that encompasses not only the economic and user involvement, but the effects of the goals and ethical codes that exist in the culture for which the technology is evolving. Considering these three points, it seems necessary to maintain them in balance to realize useful technology that is culturally and environmentally friendly.
Consideration of the Impact of Systems with Automation

User-Friendly Devices
I find it interesting that as we move further into the computer age, our technology becomes increasingly user friendly, an idiom for "less specific operational knowledge needed by the user about the device being operated." For example, by simply operating the ignition, putting the automatic transmission in the proper setting, and pressing the gas pedal, we can now operate an automobile. Use of a gear shift and clutch, choke, spark advance, manual throttle, or any control dealing with the detailed operation of the engine is unnecessary, and for younger drivers practically unknown.
Another aspect of automotive user friendliness would be the introduction of easily accessible four-wheel drive, which has given drivers increased confidence in controlling a vehicle in snowy conditions, along with the unfortunate notion that it will also stop with an equivalent amount of control.
User friendliness is most often associated with computer use. Both commercial operators and home users have purchased programs that allow them to use the computer's capability without knowledge of programming techniques or, as with the automobile controls, the inner workings of the machine. Represented by the cultural leg of Pacey's definition, these technological advances reflect our societal desire to have hardware with better performance that is easier to use, requires little maintenance, and is forgiving of operator mistakes.
Systems with Automation
Automation, in the sense used here, includes a broad range of systems that use sensing elements, computing or processing machines, and actuation or effector devices to perform both simple and complex tasks previously done by a human. These are the tools of user friendliness. In a classic article debating the role of this type of technology in society, Mesthene indicated that "technology can lead to value change either 1) by bringing some previously unattainable goal within the realm of choice or 2) by making some values easier to implement than heretofore" [5, p. 87] . For example, giving aid to developing populations would be easier if we developed a means to offer them inexpensive farming techniques and possibly communication and/or transportation capabilities. Another example might be an automated device on an aircraft that would improve all-weather capability and possibly ease the servicing of an area that previously had limited or nonexistent air travel. Of course, one could argue that the core "value" in such cases is profit. There is also a "value" to the pilot, who can be aided by new equipment and accomplish new routes and service new areas with greater safety.
Technology has made certain values and tasks easier to implement in the above cases, but a question remains as to whether there has been an associated cost beyond that of the technology development. In a 1960 essay on some consequences of automation and, in a sense, a prediction of future trends, Wiener wrote that "it is my thesis that machines can and do transcend some of the limitations of their designers, and that in doing so they may be both effective and dangerous" [6, p. 163] . One corollary of Wiener's claim is that the machine is capable of performance beyond the limits of its original design boundaries and thereby could make a "decision" that is different than the one the original designer/programmer would have made or intended in the same situation. Although this point is still being argued (and Wiener was certainly criticized for this notion [7, p. 174] ), one can say that even without learning capabilities, machines can and do alter the expected outcomes of particular instances due to: a) incomplete data sets or instructions, b) out-of-boundary conditions, c) the assumptions made by a human operating in parallel with the machine, or d) any combination of these.
A second point to be made from Wiener's quote is that the "limitations of the designer" could also relate to the design process that limits consideration of the cultural effects of the designed system. As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to define a dollar "benefit" to offset the cost of implementing a technology concept that addresses a societal issue. It seems reasonable to maintain that the user is responsible for the application of the system and its results, given operation within the advertised design boundaries. But why not, where possible, build in the capability of choice for the consumer? Although this idea is fraught with potential problems (deactivation of a critical system at an inappropriate time), the built-in program filter for young TV viewers is a pointed example. This integral censoring capability affords parents a choice as to what TV programs their children watch, a desire resulting from the increasing realization that television programming has influences beyond mere "entertainment." It seems unfortunate that the government has had to mandate such choice.
Machines, Automation, and Skill Levels
In his book Ethics in an Age of Technology, Ian Barbour discusses several perspectives on the effects of technology on social, societal, and economic structures [8, p. 13]. Historically, automation has empowered engineers, managers, and others who control a technology at the expense of workers who no longer need special skills. From a broad perspective, as more automated capability is put into a system by the engineer to achieve better safety and increased control accuracy, less specific system knowledge is required by the user. The skill level for the job is reduced to the point where many people are qualified and the job can be filled at a lower salary. Another aspect of this trend is the reduction in the range of choice in operating capability, in the sense that one is constrained by the program and its user friendliness. It would seem that for important automated systems, such as devices in safety-critical settings, design goals should include workload reduction through automation of mundane tasks, as well as aiding important system safety and critical performance tasks.
Obviously, professionals such as airline pilots are also workers in this sense, based on the premise that the improvement of automated systems may impact their capabilities for complex decision making when conditions are outside normal boundaries. Of course, the same technology provides increased safety and comfort for airline passengers and, with various adaptations, drivers of automobiles and users of plant controls. The design of systems with these capabilities falls within both the cultural and organizational aspects of Pacey's definition-the desire for ease of operation and the prospect of more efficient performance at lower cost. That there is a downside is illustrated by the following aircraft automation example.
A Control System Example
The following is an abbreviated description of an aircraft accident thought to have been caused by the interaction of the crew with one of the control systems on board, the flight management system (FMS). The description is part of the investigation report done by Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Colombia:
On December 20, 1995,...a Boeing 757,...on a regularly scheduled passenger flight,...operating under instrument flight rules,...crashed into mountainous terrain during a descent from cruise altitude in visual meteorological conditions. [9, Accident Summary] The suspected causes of the accident were further laid out in the accident report, but one of the most pointed comments was given by David Learmount in a 1995 safety review:
The FMS was entrusted with the aircraft's flightpath and, "obedient but dumb," as one U.S. pilot commentator remarked, turned the aircraft toward a beacon which the pilots believed was still ahead of them, but which, in fact, they had passed. That turn initially took the aircraft eastward toward the mountains, and the pilots acquiesced for 90 [seconds], according to the interim report, before they decided to take charge of the aircraft's heading themselves. It was too late. [10, p. 24] The investigation into this incident generated a wealth of data. An ongoing project funded by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration at Oregon State University has mapped the conclusions from the accident report onto a list of "Issues" related to flight deck automation [11] . Most interesting are the conclusions pointing to the deskilling effects of continual automation use. For example, "pilots may lose psychomotor and cognitive skills required for flying manually, or for flying non-automated aircraft, due to extensive use of automation" (Issue 065). The evidence in the report indicated that if pilots become accustomed to exclusive use of displays generated by the FMS, they can "lose the ability to quickly determine that a fix or beacon is behind them." Three other conclusions that have a bearing on the discussion of automation were cited in the investigation report [11] :
• "Pilots may not understand the structure and function of automation or the interaction of automation devices well enough to safely perform their duties." (Issue 105) • "Pilots may become complacent because they are overconfident in and uncritical of automation...." (Issue 131) • "Training philosophy, objectives, methods...may be inadequate to properly train pilots for safe and effective automated aircraft operation." (Issue 133) The conclusions raise questions on new designs for cockpit technology and for the general use of automation technology as well.
Automation and Consumer Products
If we are to introduce more and more automation into society in general, where the training level for dealing with such products is significantly less than that of an aircraft pilot, what can we expect in terms of human operator response when something goes wrong? Furthermore, the data and conclusions from the above example suggest that even under normal operating conditions, the automated system decreases human awareness of the machine being controlled and external influences that might affect its performance. And finally, if the user has to operate a nonautomated system after continued use of an automated system, the skill level applied to the manual system may be drastically reduced. One need only project these findings onto the automated systems coming into use or being planned for automobiles, such as smart cruise control and collision avoidance, to appreciate the potential extent of the problem.
As mentioned earlier, we tend to think of deskilling as a result of automation on, for example, an automobile assembly line. Here, specific mechanical skills, whether bolting or welding pieces together, assembling harnesses, or putting together and installing small subassemblies, have been replaced by an automated device, leaving workers out of a job or operating a simple controller for the automated system. That this is an economic benefit, the third aspect of Pacey's definition, is well proven. If, however, we consider the deskilling of an automobile driver in the same sense as the aircraft pilot in the above example, there are additional concerns. As new automated vehicle systems are introduced, the performance of these systems under failure conditions that require driver intervention, or the use of a nonautomated vehicle by an automation-conditioned driver, become problems that must be dealt with during the design of the system.
A simple example is the automated cruise control for automobiles that modulates speed in relation to the vehicle directly ahead, maintaining a somewhat constant separation between vehicles and adding comfort to long drives. Fault warnings must be implemented to alert the driver that the system is inoperable, and they must leave enough time to allow the driver to take effective action. One could, for example, have cruise control engaged, but the system capability to react to a differential speed with respect to the leading vehicle could have failed. A second consideration is the conditioning to automation developed over a period of time, which may affect the use of a vehicle with nonautomated control. Given the decreased awareness that occurs over an extended period of driving time, and considering the example of the airliner, the driver may by habit revert to behavior that assumes an automated vehicle. These are not simple problems and require serious and in-depth design studies involving human factors specialists and psychologists as part of the systems design team.
Engineering Responsibility
Listening to the proponents and critics, we must decide if we are simply watching a world in transition and adaptation, as has always happened, or if subtle changes are occurring that may diminish some aspect of our lives. As an example of a nonmilitant critic of technology, Barbour describes philosopher Albert Borgmann as one who "does not want to return to a pre-technological past, but...urges selection of technologies that encourage genuine human fulfillment" [8, p. 13] .
This, of course, is also fraught with problems, such as the determination of who makes the "selection" and who defines "human fulfillment." Market forces obviously have a great bearing on these decisions, and it seems reasonable that the design and marketing process provide as much choice as possible. With the same decision-making implications, Barbour provides a moderate voice, asserting that the "answer to destructive features of technology is not less technology, but technology of the right kind" [8, p. 14]. Although such moderate thinking is probably unacceptable to adamant technology proponents and critics alike, it offers an alternative to their polar differences. Unfortunately, the "right kind of technology" is often the result of trial and error (including accidents such as the above example) and the ensuing redesign.
Many new studies and designs are finding the "right technology" for aircraft controls and displays with an emphasis on the "human-centered cockpit." Inclusion of human response into the technical design, as well as proper training for that design, can certainly help alleviate problems similar to the 757 airliner incident. The hope is that all manufacturers that plan the incorporation of new, automated systems are also emphasizing human factors studies.
When it comes to aircraft and the automobile, design emphasis on human response is clearly needed, and it would now seem reasonable to extend that emphasis to other devices we use in our daily lives, such as video games, television, the computer, cellular telephones, and PDAs. We need to ask the same human-centered questions about these de-vices and ask what aspects of our lives are being diminished, or deskilled, as well as enhanced. It is also worthwhile to ask what our responsibility as design engineers should be. To be sure, psychologists (and politicians) are voicing opinions each day on these issues, but as with any complex system, the engineer must be part of this activity.
A Final Thought
As the philosopher Hannah Arendt has commented, the avalanche of fabulous instruments and ever more ingenious machinery...[has made] it more unlikely every day that man will encounter anything in the world around him that is not man made and hence is not, in the last analysis, he himself in a different disguise. [12, p. 277] Knowing how much of themselves good engineers put into the conception and development of a design, this idea is particularly intriguing. All the ethics and standards, good decisions, logical analysis, and good technical design, along with the imperfections, doubts, and mistakes of the designer, are reflected in the final product.
Good technology, and there is a lot of it, truly represents the three points of Pacey's definition: cultural, organizational, and technical. Increased sensitivity to all facets that influence a design and its future use is a reasonable goal for us as designers. Although in context Arendt's quote was somewhat pessimistic, the products we design can reflect a caring and knowledgeable attitude, so that when we do encounter ourselves in the things around us, we will like what we see.
